Speakers: please email handouts, slides, drafts to [email protected] by Wed Oct 30.
Saturday, 2 Nov 2024 | Kant's Practical Philosophy | Marquette University, Marquette Hall 105
09:00–09:30 Breakfast
MORNING SESSIONS Chair, Dustin Trampe, Marquette university
09:30–10:40 “sPECULATION, mETHOD, AND sELF-kNOWLEDGE in
Kant's Conjectural Beginning of Human History”
Carlos SCHOOF, Northwestern University
Kant's Conjectural Beginning of Human History”
Carlos SCHOOF, Northwestern University
In the present paper, I provide an account of the purpose and methodology of Kant’s Conjectural Beginning that shows its specific functions in both his theoretical and practical philosophy. I show that Conjectural Beginning belongs to a genre of historical writing referenced in its title: conjectural history. I argue that Conjectural Beginning is an original instance of this genre since its main purpose is not to offer an account of possible facts about what happened in earlier history, but to help the reader understand herself as a moral agent (instead of as a mere natural being) that must contribute to the achievement of humankind’s vocation (instead of either trusting or blaming providence). To accomplish his practical goal, however, Kant also accomplishes the theoretical goal of offering a reasonable story of the earliest history of mankind, since indulging in wild conjectures would provoke the incredulity of the reader and frustrate her self-knowledge. This reasonable story is a philosophical appropriation of Genesis because the latter provides a strong narrative with archetypical characters and events that facilitate the teaching of the moral lessons Kant believes are relevant.
In the first section, I show that this essay has the essential properties of this historical genre, although it illustrates them in a more philosophical way. In the second section, I address the methodology of Conjectural Beginning, that is, the criteria of adequacy with which we judge the reasonableness of a conjectural story. I argue that these criteria can be clarified by focusing on the cognitive sources to which Kant appeals: imagination, experience, and reason. In the third section, I make explicit the practical importance of the essay. I show how it fulfills the practical functions of grounding our belief in moral progress, contributing to the reader’s moral self-knowledge and curing some misconceptions that might obstruct her commitment to moral progress.
In the first section, I show that this essay has the essential properties of this historical genre, although it illustrates them in a more philosophical way. In the second section, I address the methodology of Conjectural Beginning, that is, the criteria of adequacy with which we judge the reasonableness of a conjectural story. I argue that these criteria can be clarified by focusing on the cognitive sources to which Kant appeals: imagination, experience, and reason. In the third section, I make explicit the practical importance of the essay. I show how it fulfills the practical functions of grounding our belief in moral progress, contributing to the reader’s moral self-knowledge and curing some misconceptions that might obstruct her commitment to moral progress.
10:50–12:00 “ON THE eNFORCEMENT OF cOSMOPOLITAN jUSTICE”
Gabriel Sanchez Ainsa, Northwestern University
Gabriel Sanchez Ainsa, Northwestern University
This paper offers a potential solution to the “enforcement” or “institutionalization” problem of cosmopolitan justice (ius cosmopoliticum) in Kant’s Perpetual Peace and Metaphysics of Morals. Given the absence of a world-state the unfeasibility and undesirability of a world-state, readers of Kant are left wondering, in what way can cosmopolitan justice be enforceable at all? Scholars have tried to solve this problem by either relaxing the coercibility of cosmopolitan justice or by insisting that the federation of nations should have coercive powers. I propose an alternative, two-part solution. I argue that cosmopolitan justice is coercible, but rather than through a coercive world-order, the realization of these duties takes place through domestic enforcement. While Kant’s voluntary league of nations can draft treaties, set norms for states, and resolve disputes through global quasi-judicial institutions, the global community “delegates” to states the authority to enforce cosmopolitan justice. In conditions of cosmopolitan justice, states employ their coercive authority on their own citizens to protect the human rights of non-citizens at home and abroad. However, one may object that this “domestic enforcement” solution does not coerce states to establish domestic enforcement mechanisms. For this reason, I introduce a second part to my solution: we have non-coercible duties to establish the mechanisms of domestic enforcement of cosmopolitan justice. While world-citizens have determinate coercible rights and duties within the system of cosmopolitan justice, the duty to establish and sustain this system in the first place—the duty to work incessantly towards perpetual peace—is non-coercible. For this reason, Kant introduces the “moral politician” in Perpetual Peace as the kind of statesman who will reform the juridical-political system of their state even in the absence of coercion. This character, I argue, showcases the limits of coercion and the importance of virtue in Kant’s political and cosmopolitan project.
12:00–13:00 Lunch
AFTERNOON SESSIONS Chair, Yoon Choi, Marquette University
13:00–14:10 "Kant on Property: Knowledge of Oneself and the Other"
Lucas Johnston, University of California Riverside
Lucas Johnston, University of California Riverside
It is often complained that Kant lacks a deduction of other free beings in his philosophy. This defect is often traced to the very form of proof used to prove the reality of one’s freedom: a first-personal proof. Since the proof of freedom is only addressed to each person individually, it is thought that Kant is unable to provide an account of how we know other beings—other persons—to be free. This problem is often discussed in isolation from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. In this paper, I seek to rectify this omission. Taking a cue from Hegel who argues that property joins together independent free beings, I argue that Kant incorporates the recognition of other free beings into his philosophy through relations of right, beginning with property relations. Such relations can only understood be interpersonally, as a relation that I bear to you through an object in the world. Further, I suggest that for Kant it is necessary for free beings to possess property. This means that for Kant, ultimately, the comprehension of our own freedom necessarily includes the comprehension of other free beings. For Kant, there is no second step to be taken from the knowledge of my freedom to my knowledge of the freedom of another. Insofar as I understand myself as free, I already understand myself to be standing in relation to other free beings.
Handout
Handout
14:20–15:30 “Kant’s Concept of the Heart and Its Development”
Bas TÖnissen, UC-San Diego
Bas TÖnissen, UC-San Diego
Kant’s Religion is full of references to the ‘heart’, including in central terms like ‘change of heart.’ However, Kant never defines the heart, and few interpreters note it as a distinct technical term. I show that he indeed regarded it as such, and that it cannot be equated to other Kantian terms like 'character' or 'will', by examining the consistent development of ‘heart’ throughout his Anthropology lectures. Kant there understands the heart as our characteristic Sinnesart (‘way of sensing’), the distinctive emotions and motivations that make us act. It is merely natural, and therefore cannot be morally imputed to us. In Religion, however, Kant argues that we are responsible for our own natures. He accordingly incorporates our freely chosen Denkungsart, ‘way of thinking’, into the heart alongside the Sinnesart. The heart now becomes moral and plays the role of connecting our intelligible and sensible natures. This explains its striking absence from the published Anthropology. Kant’s reintroduction of ‘heart’ in his mature moral theory reflects his realization that morality should transform not just our principles, but the whole - rational and sensible - human being. Finally, I suggest that Kant's religious context explains why he does not draw attention to his reappropriation of the heart from his Pietist environment. By using familiar language and quietly giving it new meaning, Kant can both avoid censorship and draw in potentially sympathetic Pietist readers.
Handout
Handout
15:30–16:00 Coffee Break
PANEL: KANT, DIGNITY, AND LOVE Moderator, bill bristow, University of wisconsin-milwaukee
16:00–18:00 sPEAKER: KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN, nORTHWESTERN University
sPEAKER: Jordan Pascoe, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
sPEAKER: Jordan Pascoe, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
"'THE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT REALIZATION THAT SOMETHING OTHER THAN ONE'S SELF IS REAL':
IRIS MURDOCH ON LOVE AND MORALITY"
KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN, Northwestern University
IRIS MURDOCH ON LOVE AND MORALITY"
KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN, Northwestern University
Iris Murdoch claims that “the central concept of morality is the individual thought of as knowable by love.” In this paper, I develop her conception of love and compare her view with Kant’s commitment to the dignity of persons.
I begin by contrasting Murdoch’s view of interpersonal love with leading contemporary accounts, and argue for its superiority. Distinctive to Murdoch is the ides that love is infinitely perfectable, and so love is “an endless task.”
The idea that the central concept of morality is the individual is familiar from Kantian moral theory. Kant says that each person has dignity and he talks about the value of humanity. In Murdoch we find the idea that the way to gain understanding of that value is to think about the sort of value you find in those you love. I compare this Murdochian commitment to some central tenets of Kant’s view and those of contemporary moral theorists of Kantian temperament and argue that the two approaches have more in common than Murdoch herself realized.
Handout
Handout
"ON SHARING ENDS: KANTIAN MODELS OF INTIMACY, SEX, AND CARE"
Jordan Pascoe, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Kant is a sexual pessimist. This is to say that he thinks sex is so morally dangerous – cannibalistic, even – that the forms of consent and contract that govern other kinds of permissible relationships are insufficient to remedy the moral dangers of sex. This is because sex involves both objectifying others, and objectifying ourselves: when we have sex we treat ourselves and each other as things, rather than as ends. Kant’s solution is to propose that sex is permissible in relationships in which we “share ends” with another person. This conception of sharing ends is also taken to be central to caregiving relationships, in parenting and other kinds of intimate labor. This paper examines the moral intimacy required for such a practice of “sharing ends”, and how such intimacy relates to broader Kantian notions of dignity and respect. It examines how “sharing ends” combines duties to oneself with duties to others, and poses a set of epistemic questions: how well do I need to know another’s ends to share them? Finally, it explores whether sharing ends rests upon a prior duty to set such ends in the first place, by exploring the distinction between sharing ends set by another, and sharing ends chosen by oneself.
Jordan Pascoe, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Kant is a sexual pessimist. This is to say that he thinks sex is so morally dangerous – cannibalistic, even – that the forms of consent and contract that govern other kinds of permissible relationships are insufficient to remedy the moral dangers of sex. This is because sex involves both objectifying others, and objectifying ourselves: when we have sex we treat ourselves and each other as things, rather than as ends. Kant’s solution is to propose that sex is permissible in relationships in which we “share ends” with another person. This conception of sharing ends is also taken to be central to caregiving relationships, in parenting and other kinds of intimate labor. This paper examines the moral intimacy required for such a practice of “sharing ends”, and how such intimacy relates to broader Kantian notions of dignity and respect. It examines how “sharing ends” combines duties to oneself with duties to others, and poses a set of epistemic questions: how well do I need to know another’s ends to share them? Finally, it explores whether sharing ends rests upon a prior duty to set such ends in the first place, by exploring the distinction between sharing ends set by another, and sharing ends chosen by oneself.